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THE MEANING OF "PUBLIC" IN SECTION 709(e) OF
THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT AND ACCESS TO
INFORMATION GATHERED BY THE EEOC
INTRODUCTION
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19641 forms the basis
of a comprehensive federal program 2 guaranteeing equal em-
ployment opportunities.3 Under Title VII, all employment dis-
crimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national ori-
gin is prohibited.' A two-pronged enforcement mechanism is
utilized, which combines private litigation by an aggrieved
party with conciliation and litigation efforts by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission 5 (hereinafter referred
to as EEOC or Commission). An aggrieved person must first
file a charge with the EEOC;6 the EEOC then investigates and,
if it finds that probable cause exists to believe that Title VII
has been violated, it attempts to eliminate the discrimination
by "informal methods of conference, conciliation and persua-
sion.17 If a settlement is not reached within 180 days of the date
the charge was filed, the person charging discrimination may
bring a private action against the employer.' To aid the charg-
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-e-17 (1976).
2 Other federal sources of legal protection for equal employment opportunities
include: The National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1976); The Equal Pay
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976); The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,'
29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1976); The Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§
701-94 (1976); The Vietnam Era Veterans Readjustment Act of 1974, 38 U.S.C. §§
2011-14 (1976). See also Exec. Order No. 11,141, 3 C.F.R. § 179 (1964); Exec. Order
No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. § 339 (1964).
Forty-six states have fair employment practice laws supplementing Title VII.
See Connolly & Connolly, Equal Employment Opportunities: Case Law Overview, 29
MERcER L. Rav. 677, 682 & n.21 (1978).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1976).
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission consists of five Commission-
ers and a general counsel appointed by the President, subject to approval by the
Senate. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(a), (b) (1976).
' The charge must be filed within 180 days of the date upon which the discrimina-
tory act occurred. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1976).
7'Id.
K Id. § 2000e-5(f)(1). The EEOC can also bring a civil action if the conciliation
attempts fail. The charging party can bring a private action at any one of three
junctures in the administrative process: after a determination of no reasonable cause;
after a finding of reasonable cause, a failure of conciliation and a determination that
the case will not be litigated by the EEOC; and, at any point 180 days after the charge
was filed if the Commission has not filed an action or entered into a conciliation
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ing party's determination of whether to bring a private action,
the EEOC, pursuant to its own regulation, permits disclosure
to the complaining party or his attorney of information ob-
tained during its administrative investigation of the claim of
employment discrimination.9 However, section 709(e) of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits making public any informa-
tion obtained by the Commission during its administrative in-
vestigation of the charge prior to the institution of a private
Title VII action by the aggrieved party. 0 The federal circuit
courts of appeal have experienced difficulty in reconciling these
two positions. The problem presented is whether the Commis-
sion's release of investigatory information" to the charging
agreement to which he is a party. The private action must be brought within 90 days
after receiving the statutory notice of right to sue letter from the Commission. Id.
9 29 C.F.R. § 1601.20 (1977). 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(a) (1976) authorizes the Com-
mission to promulgate procedural regulations in conformity with the Administrative
Procedure Act. The EEOC adopted its disclosure rule pursuant to this authority.
Before releasing the file to the charging party the Commission deletes any confidential
or irrelevant information. EEOC COMPL. MAN. (CCH) 1788.
1' It shall be unlawful for any officer or employee of the Commission to
make public in any manner whatever any information obtained by the Com-
mission pursuant to its authority under this section prior to the institution
of any proceeding under this subchapter involving such information. Any
officer or employee of the Commission who shall make public in any manner
whatever any information in violation of this subsection shall be guilty, of a
misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than
$1,000, or imprisoned not more than one year.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(e) (1976).
11 Section 709(e) deals only with information acquired by the EEOC during its
investigation of the charge. Section 706(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1976), prohibits
disclosure by the Commission of anything said or done during the settlement efforts
without written consent of the persons concerned. The D.C. Circuit in Sears, Roebuck
and Co. v. EEOC, 581 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir. 1978), raises a troublesome point about the
relationship between § 706(b) and § 709(e). Pointing out that both sections prohibit
disclosure to the "public", it asserts that they both should be given the same meaning.
581 F.2d at 948. However, there are strong policy reasons for prohibiting disclosure of
settlement materials which are not applicable to the disclosure of investigatory files.
Most important is that if the settlement process is to function effectively an employer
must be able to negotiate without fear of anything he might inadvertantly reveal being
disclosed to the charging party. Id. Moreover, an employer who is fearful of such
information being revealed to a prospective plaintiff can resist the conciliation process.
Id. (quoting Sears, Roebuck and Co. v. EEOC, 435 F. Supp. 751, 759 (D.D.C. 1977)).
On the other hand, such an employer would not be able to resist the EEOC's investiga-
tive efforts. See notes 45-47 and accompanying text infra for a discussion of this point.
So, while disclosure of settlement materials might disrupt and perhaps end such nego-
tiations, it is unlikely that disclosure of information contained in the investigatory file
would have a similar impact on the EEOC's investigation and its ability to obtain the
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party prior to his institution of a private action is an unlawful
disclosure to the "public" under the nondisclosure provision
contained in section 709(e).
In H. Kessler & Co. v. EEOC'2 the Fifth Circuit, sitting en
banc, addressed the question and held that disclosure to a
charging party and his attorney of the party's file prior to the
institution of a legal proceeding was not prohibited. The ques-
tion arose again five years later when the District of Columbia
Circuit in Sears, Roebuck and Co. v. EEOC'3 and the Seventh
Circuit in Burlington Northern, Inc. v. EEOC'4 disagreed with
the Kessler court and held that the term "public" did encom-
pass the charging party and his attorney and thus refused to
allow disclosure.
This comment focuses on this split in the circuits over the
information. Thus, it may be necessary to interpret § 706(b) and § 709(e) differently,
despite the similarity of the language and the desire for symmetry.
12 472 F.2d 1147 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973).
12 581 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir. 1978). Sears was attempting to prevent the disclosure
of its consolidated national file to an unspecified number of charging parties. The Sears
court declined to follow the Kessler court's decision to whatever extent it was inconsis-
tant with the Sears holding. However, it noted that the cases were "not necessarily
inconsistent," due to the difference in the sizes of the proposed disclosures involved in
the two cases. 581 F.2d at 947-48.
I 582 F.2d 1096 (7th Cir. 1978). Burlington Northern brought this action to enjoin
the disclosure of its EEOC national investigatory file to a number of individual charg-
ing parties who had instituted suit. As a result, the Seventh Circuit did not have to
decide the issue whether disclosure to the charging party and his attorney prior to
litigation constituted "making public" the information. However, the court stated its
holding broadly, clearly intending that disclosure should be prohibited to charging
parties before suit is filed: "[W]e hold, as . . . in Sears, Roebuck, that individual
charging parties are members of the public under § 709(e) to whom investigatory
materials may not be disclosed prior to the institution of judicial proceedings." Id. at
1100. Regarding disclosure after the instigation of a Title VII proceeding, the court held
that the Commission may only disclose that information which is "directly relevant
to the individual plaintiff's claims." Id. at 1101. The plaintiffs in Burlington Northern
had brought class action suits and sought information "relevant to the allegations of
discrimination against the broader class." Id. By limiting the amount of information
that could be disclosed after the filing of a Title VII suit to only that information which
is relevant to the individual plaintiffs, the court gave the word "public" as it appears
.in § 709(e) a narrow definition indeed. Thus, the court absolutely prohibited the
disclosure of information to a charging party before his suit is filed and only permitted
limited disclosure after his suit is filed.
Moreover, the court refused to distinguish the Fifth Circuit's holding in Kessler
on the basis of the vast difference in the size of the proposed disclosures in the two
cases. Id. at 1100-01. Interestingly, the EEOC has the practice of deleting any irrele-
vant or confidential matters from the file prior to releasing it to the charging party and
his attorney. EEOC COMPL. MAN. (CCH) 1788.
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question of whether, for purposes of section 709(e) of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, disclosure by the EEOC of its investigative
files to a charging party and his attorney amounts to making
the information public. The issue will be addressed through an
examination of the Kessler, Burlington Northern, and Sears
opinions, the sources upon which they were based, and some
practical considerations of the disclosure question.
I. EEOC CONCILIATION V. PmVATE LITIGATION
Because of the lack of legislative history concerning section
709(e),' 5 the Burlington Northern and Sears courts considered
the section in terms of its relation to the statutory scheme for
enforcing Title VII and the impact that disclosure would have
on that scheme."8 Specifically, they focused on which prong of
the enforcement mechanism-private litigation or the concilia-
tion process--Congress intended to be the primary means for
obtaining equal employment opportunity."7 The Sears and
Burlington Northern courts explored the question of Congres-
sional intent in some depth and found that the EEOC, through
its conciliation and litigation efforts, was intended to be the
primary enforcer of Title VII. Moreover, both courts thought
that disclosure of the investigative file would encourage private
litigation. Because they felt that private litigation would
hinder the EEOC's efforts, they concluded that Congress did
not intend to undercut its primary enforcement mechanism by
permitting disclosure."
' 472 F.2d at 1151. See Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDUS. & COM.
L. RaV. 431, 457 (1966).
Although both the Kessler and Sears courts discussed the legislative history of §
709(e), their efforts are not convincing. The Kessler court points to an ambiguous
statement Senator Humphrey made while introducing the compromise amendment
which eventually became Title VII. 472 F.2d at 1150. The Sears court, without citing
any source, states that Congress' intention in enacting § 709(e) was to prevent disclo-
sure of sensitive data to persons outside the government. 581 F,2d at 947.
" Burlington Northern, 582 F.2d at 1099.1100; Sears, 581 F.2d at 946.
" The Fifth Circuit in Kessler never directly confronted the question of which
prong Congress intended to serve as the primary enforcement mechanism. Rather, the
court discussed and built its argument around the importance of the private litigant.
472 F.2d at 1149.
" Sears, 581 F.2d at 946; Burlington Northern, 582 F.2d at 1099-1100.
" Sears, 581 F.2d at 946; Burlington Northern, 582 F.2d at 1100.
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A. The Legislative Record
To determine Congressional intent, the Burlington
Northern court first looked to the legislative history of Title
VII." It concluded that the "primary responsibility for insuring
equal employment opportunity" was lodged with the EEOC.21
However, the legislative record is not as clear as the court
would have it appear. For example, the court points to a state-
ment in the section-by-section analysis of the bill amending
Title VI22 as indicative of Congressional intent to make concili-
ation the primary method of enforcement: "'It is hoped that
recourse to the private lawsuit will be the exception and not the
rule, and that the vast majority of complaints will be handled
through the offices of the EEOC.' 23 The next sentence in the
analysis, however, casts a completely different light on the
quoted language: "[A]s the individual's rights to redress are
paramount under the provisions of Title VII it is necessary that
all avenues be left open for quick and effective relief. ' 24 In
addition, there are frequent instances throughout the legisla-
tive record of conflicting statements by Congressmen as to the
proper interpretation of the statutory language.2 Also, because
both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 were completely
changed after leaving committee, 2 the committee reports pro-
vide little guidance.
What then can be gleaned from the legislative record? Al-
though Congress considered comprehensive settlements
through conciliation an important part of Title VII enforce-
ment and the most desirable method for resolution of employ-
2 582 F.2d at 1099-1100.
21 Id.
2 H.R. 1746, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972). H.R. 1746 was enacted as the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 86 Stat. 103 (1972).
21 582 F.2d at 1100 (quoting 118 CONG. REc. 7565 (1972)).
2 "118 CONG. Rac. 7565 (1972).
For example, Senator Ervin, 110 CONG. RFC. 14188 (1964), and Representative
Celler, id. at 2566, interpreted § 706(f)(1) to mean that a charging party could not bring
a private action until the EEOC had terminated its conciliation efforts. Senator Javits,
id. at 14191, and Senator Humphrey, id. at 14188, stated that § 706(0(1) did not
require the charging party to wait until the conciliation process had ended to bring his
action.
1 Vaas, supra note 15, at 457; Sape & Hart, Title VII Reconsidered: The Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 40 GEo. WASH. L. Rav. 824, 836-45 (1971-72).
[Vol. 67
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ment discrimination disputes,2 it also recognized the inherent
limitations of voluntary conciliation. 8 Indeed, the primary
impetus behind the enactment of the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Act of 1972 was Congressional dissatisfaction with
conciliation as the primary means of enforcing Title V1I.2' The
House Committee's report on H.R. 1946 stated: "It has been
the emphasis on voluntariness that has proven to be most detri-
mental to the successful operation of Title VII."0
Congress did not, as suggested by the Seventh Circuit in
Burlington Northern, view the individual litigant's right to file
a private action merely as an escape hatch from "'the adminis-
trative quagmire' which could develop if a case could not
promptly be processed by the Commission."'" Instead, Con-
gress considered private litigation an important part of the
Title VII enforcement mechanism.12 Moreover, in adopting the
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Congress recog-
nized that "aggressive individual litigants had made substan-
tial contributions to the development of Title VII law and that
their actions should not be curtailed." 3  Although the legisla-
tive record is not complete, it is fair to conclude that Congress
did not intend to discourage and hinder private litigation until
the conciliation process was complete. Thus, the Seventh and
District of Columbia Circuits' emphasis on the primacy of the
EEOC's efforts and the need to discourage private litigation
which might hinder these efforts appears to be unfounded.
B. Statutory Restrictions on the Private Action
Further evidence of Congressional intent regarding the re-
lationship between the private action and EEOC conciliation
is provided by an examination of restrictions on private litiga-
tion." The charging party must first give the EEOC an oppor-
" 118 CONG. Rac. 7563 (1972).
H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 9, reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2137, 2144.
2" Id. at 3, 9.
"Id. at 9.
, 582 F.2d at 1099 (quoting in part H.R. RaP. No. 238, supra note 28, at 2148).
118 CONG. Rac. 7565 (1972); Sape & Hart, supra note 26, at 879.
Sape & Hart, supra note 26, at 879. See Belton, Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964: A Decade of Private Enforcement and Judicial Development, 25 ST. Louis
U. L.J. 225, 229-30 (1975).
' None of the opinions examined these restrictions or the reasons behind them.
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tunity to perform its investigatory and conciliatory functions. 5
Thus, before the aggrieved party can bring a Title VII action
he must first file a charge with the EEOC and allow the Com-
mission 180 days36 to conciliate or file its own action." More-
over, section 706(f)(1) provides that the EEOC can petition a
court to stay a private action for sixty days "pending further
action of the Commission to obtain voluntary compliance."' ,"
However, once these time restrictions on the right to private
litigation have expired there is no indication in the statutory
language that Congress intended to subordinate the private
action to the conciliation process.
Furthermore, while considering the 1972 amendments to
Title VII, Congress had evidence before it that the EEOC was,
in the majority of cases, unable to complete its investigatory
and conciliatory tasks within the 180 day period. 9 Congress
could have extended the restrictive period if it had been con-
cerned that the Commission should be allowed to complete the
conciliation process without having its efforts "undercut" by
private litigation. Interestingly, it chose not to extend the re-
strictive period. 0 Indeed, the Education and Labor Committee
of the House, when discussing private actions pursuant to Title
VII, stated: "It would. . . be appropriate for the individual to
institute a court action where the delay is occasioned by ad-
ministrative inefficiencies. The primary concern must be pro-
tection of the aggrieved person's system to seek a prompt rem-
edy in the best manner possible."4
1 EEOC v. General Electric Co., 532 F.2d 359, 364 (4th Cir. 1976); Sanchez v.
Standard Brands, 431 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1970).
u 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1976). If the state in which the discriminatory act
occurred has a recognized fair employment practices agency, the EEOC must defer the
charge to it for 60 days. Id. § 2000e-5(d) (1976). The 180 day restriction on private
actions begins running after 60 days or after termination of proceedings by the state
agency, whichever is earlier. Id. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1976). Thus in many instances the
charging party must wait 240 days before bringing his private action.
* 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1976). If the Commission does bring an action based
on the charge, the charging party can intervene. Similarly, the Commission can inter-
vene in an action brought by the charging party if the case is of general public impor-
tance. Id.
39 Id.
Z' H.R. REP. No. 238, supra note 28, at 2147-48.
Indeed, Congress has taken steps to aid the private litigant in bringing his
action. The court may appoint an attorney for the litigant and allow him to bring the
action without payment of fees, costs, or security. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1976).
11 H.R. REP. No. 238, supra note 28, at 2148.
[Vol. 67
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II. PRAcncAL ASPECTS OF DiscLosuRE
A. Effect On Employer Cooperation With EEOC
Investigations
Both the Sears and Burlington Northern courts asserted
that disclosure would hinder the Commission's investigative
efforts since employers would be tempted to resist EEOC re-
quests for information if they knew the material would be
turned over for use in a private action.2 Such fears are without
substance. Section 709(e) prohibits the disclosure to the
"public" of investigatory materials only up to the time a Title
VII action is filed.4 3 Employers are aware that regardless of how
the courts define "public" the investigatory materials will be
turned over to a charging party once he files a private Title VII
action.44 Thus, in most instances there would be no added im-
petus for an employer fearful of the materials being turned over
to a charging party to resist the Commission's investigation,
because a charging party is allowed to obtain them before
bringing an action. It is only in the case of a charging party who
will not bring an action without access to his Commission file
that an employer has any incentive to resist EEOC requests for
information. But it seems doubtful that such a speculative
incentive would prompt an employer to resist disclosure. Even
if it did, given the broad scope of the Commission's investiga-
tive power,45 its subpoena power,4" and the courts' willingness
to uphold these subpoenas,4" employer resistance to EEOC re-
quests for information would prove fruitless.
The Burlington Northern and Sears courts were also con-
cerned that the Commission's use of its coercive power to meet
employer resistance might inject "unnecessary adversariness
into the process of dealing with employment practices."" Such
,2 Sears, 581 F.2d at 946; Burlington Northern, 582 F.2d at 1100.
" 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(e) (1976).
"Id. See also Burlington Northern, Inc. v. EEOC, 582 F.2d 1097 (7th Cir. 1978).
However, the court in Burlington Northern interpreted "public" as narrowly as possi-
ble: they held that a Title VII litigant who had filed suit could only obtain information
relevant to his case. Thus, information can be made "public" only to the one who is
involved in the case. See note 14 supra for a discussion of Burlington Northern.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(a) (1976); Sape & Hart, supra note 26, at 871-72.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-9 (1976); B. SCHIm & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DIsCRmINA-
TMON LAw 778-79 (1969).
,1 Sape & Hart, supra note 26, at 872 & n.315.
18 Burlington Northern, 582 F.2d at 1100. See also Sears, 581 F.2d at 947.
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adversariness, they predicted, might interfere with the EEOC's
ability to obtain a voluntary settlement. But the Commission
has seldom been forced to use its coercive powers49 since it first
permitted disclosure to a charging party in 1965.11 For example,
the Los Angeles District Office, in investigating 16,750 charges,
has only used its coercive powers three times.51 In light of its
infrequent use of its coercive powers it is fair to conclude that
the EEOC's disclosure practices have not adversely affected its
relationship with employers.
B. Impact of Nondisclosure on the Private Litigant
Although all three courts agreed that nondisclosure dis-
courages private litigation,5 - only the Kessler court explored
the issue.5 3 The court pointed to the difficulty that parties had
in obtaining competent attorneys to handle their Title VII ac-
tions. It asserted that without the information that is likely to
be in the investigatory file, a charging party had little hope of
persuading an already reluctant attorney to take his case."
However, as the Sears court noted, section 706(f)(1) empowers
the court, in circumstances it deems just, to appoint an attor-
ney for a private litigant and to "'authorize the commence-
ment of the action without the payment of fees, costs, or secu-
rity' ".15 The court may also award the prevailing party a rea-
sonable attorney's fee." Thus, although a charging party might
still be hampered in persuading an attorney to take his case if
he does not have the file, his position is not as bleak as sug-
gested by the Kessler court.
Even though a charging party does not always need his
investigatory file to obtain an attorney, the information in the
file would enable a charging party and his attorney more accu-
" B. ScHLtI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 46, at 779.
so The EEOC regulation allowing disclosure first appeared at 42 C.F.R. § 1601.20
(1966).
5 B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 46, at 779 n.70.
12 This finding is the negative implication of the Sears and Burlington Northern
courts' assertion that disclosure would encourage private litigation. Burlington
Northern, 582 F.2d at 1100; Sears, 581 F.2d at 946. See also Kessler & Co. v. EEOC,
472 F.2d 1147, 1151-56 (5th Cir. 1973).
= 472 F.2d at 1151-52.
Id.
581 F.2d at 948 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1976)).
5' 581 F.2d at 948 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1976)).
[Vol. 67
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rately to assess their course of action. Because an employer
seldom openly discriminates,57 a charging party often has only
a suspicion of discrimination. 8 He must determine whether
practices and policies which are neutral on their face are in fact
discriminatory.59 The information necessary to make this deter-
mination"0 would not normally be available to the charging
party. The charging party and his attorney in many instances
are then forced to bring an action with only the slightest in-
formation. With access to the EEOC's investigatory files, a
charging party and his attorney could make a more informed
and presumably more accurate decision on whether to bring
an action. ' Viewed in this manner, disclosure of investigatory
files to the charging party would not simply "fuel private liti-
gation," but would serve to reduce the number of unfounded
private actions.
C. Nondisclosure and Delay in Bringing the Private Action
The predicted effect of nondisclosure is to delay the com-
mencement of private actions until the conciliation process has
ended. 2 The median span of the conciliation process is seven-
teen and one-half months.63 Even then, less than one-half of the
cases in which a reasonable cause determination is made are
resolved through conciliation. 4 Thus, while it is not clear that
Congress intended that a charging party wait until the end of
the conciliation process to bring a private action, a majority of
charging parties will wait eighteen months or longer only to
11 See Brown v. Gaston County Dyeing Mach. Co., 457 F.2d 1377, 1382 (4th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 982 (1972).
H. Kessler & Co. v. EEOC, 472 F.2d 1147, 1151-52 (5th Cir. 1973).
2, Belton, supra note 33, at 249.
" See id. at 249-53 for a discussion of the evidence necessary to establish a prima
facie case of employment discrimination. Some of the information a charging party and
his attorney would need in order to make an informed decision on whether to bring an
action includes the make-up of the employer's work force, his hiring records, and his
criteria for employment and promotion.
" This discussion is not to suggest that a charging party must be able to prove
his case before bringing an action. That is the purpose of discovery. Instead, the
purpose of the discussion is to point out that a charging party and his attorney need
to have some idea whether he has been illegally discriminated against before bringing
an action.
12 See Burlington Northern Inc. v. EEOC, 582 F.2d 1097 (7th Cir. 1978).
a 93 LAB. REL. RE. (BNA) 104, 106.
it Id.
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find themselves back where they started. Such a delay imposes
an unfair burden on the Title VII litigant" and contravenes the
intentions of Congress which emphasized the charging party's
right to timely action."
CONCLUSION
Thus, it appears that the two underlying premises of both
the Sears and Burlington Northern opinions are open to ques-
tion. First, although the legislative record is not free from am-
biguity, there is little in the history of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 or the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 to
indicate that Congress intended to promote the EEOC's efforts
to such a predominant position that actions by private litigants
should be throttled or discouraged. Indeed, once a charging
party has fulfilled the filing requirement and the time restric-
tions have elapsed, the legislative scheme places no limitations
on the right to bring a private action. Second, it is unclear that
the threat of private actions will have any appreciable impact
on the effectiveness of the conciliation process. While these
points do not resolve the disclosure question, they militate
against a court forbidding disclosure in order to discourage
private litigation. Keeping in mind the humanitarian and
remedial underpinnings of Title VII, the useful function per-
formed by disclosure in reducing the number of unfounded
actions, and the burden imposed on the charging party by long
delays, section 709(e) should be interpreted to allow disclosure
to the charging party or his attorney before a Title VII pro-
ceeding is brought.
Mark R. Overstreet
H. Kessler & Co. v. EEOC, 472 F.2d 1147, 1149 (5th Cir. 1973). See Cooksey,
The Role of Law in Equal Employment Opportunity, 7 B.C. INDus. & COM. L. REV.
417, 427 (1966).
" H.R. REP. No. 238, supra note 28, at 12, 59-62.
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